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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Thomas Fernandez appeals from the district court’s order summarily dismissing his
petition for post-conviction relief. He submits that the district court abused its discretion when it
denied his Motion for the Appointment of Counsel.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated in
Mr. Fernandez’s Appellant’s Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are
incorporated herein by reference.

1

ISSUE
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. Fernandez’s Motion for the
Appointment of Counsel because it applied the incorrect legal standard?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Mr. Fernandez’s Motion For The
Appointment Of Counsel Because It Applied The Incorrect Legal Standard
In its Respondent’s Brief, the State argues that, because “Idaho appellate courts have
repeatedly explained that the actual level of alcohol concentration in a subject’s blood is
irrelevant under the per se theory,” Mr. Fernandez’s petition fails to raise the possibility of a
valid claim because “there is no legal basis for pursuing expert witness testimony regarding what
is, by definition, legally irrelevant evidence.” (Respondent’s Brief, pp.5-6.) However, after the
State filed its Respondent’s Brief, the Idaho Supreme Court issued its opinion in State v. Austin,
___ Idaho ___, 413 P.3d 778 (2018). Austin makes it clear that a defendant’s blood alcohol
concentration at the time of driving is legally relevant evidence, and the DUI statute does not
“mandate an unassailable conclusion not open to defense” when someone is charged under the
per se theory. Id. at 781-82. In other words, breath test results can be challenged in order to
present a complete defense.
Mr. Austin wanted to pursue expert testimony to show that his alcohol concentration was
not above the legal limit when he drove because it rose between the time he drove and the time
he took the breath tests. Id. at 779. In this case, Mr. Fernandez wanted to pursue expert
testimony to show that his alcohol concentration was not above the legal limit when he drove
because his health conditions adversely affected his breath test results. (R., p.67.) The State
argues that Mr. Fernandez did not have a right to present a defense with the assistance of expert
testimony because a driving under the influence “‘violation can be shown simply by the results
of a test for alcohol concentration . . . .’” (Respondent’s Brief, p.6 (quoting State v. Jones, 160
Idaho 449, 451 (2016).) Austin, however, makes it clear that Mr. Fernandez had a right to have
an expert testify as to how his health conditions affected his test results because his alcohol
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concentration when he was driving was relevant. Therefore, the State’s argument on this point
fails.
Additionally, while the State agrees that the standard for appointment of counsel on postconviction has changed, it argues that the district court did not specifically rely on the statute that
no longer controls when it denied Mr. Fernandez’s motion for the appointment of counsel.
(Respondent’s Brief, p.7.) But the issue here is not whether the district court specifically relied
on the statute that no longer controls but whether the district court abused its discretion when it
recognized that Mr. Fernandez had not provided factual support for his claims but did not
recognize that Swader v. State, 143 Idaho 651, 654-55 (2007) required it to consider whether
Mr. Fernandez’s circumstances prevented him from providing that factual support before
denying his motion for the appointment of counsel. (Appellant’s Brief, pp.6-7.)
The State also claims that the district court did not abuse its discretion because “the legal
standard of the reasonable person with adequate means still survives.” (Respondent’s Brief, p.7.)
Again, this does not directly respond to the relevant argument. In denying Mr. Fernandez’s
motion for the appointment of counsel, the district court failed to consider why Mr. Fernandez
did not provide the sufficient facts to support his claims. (R., pp.29-30.) This was required by
Swader. And Mr. Fernandez made it clear — in his memorandum in support of his objection to
the court’s notice of intent to dismiss — that the reason he was not able to present supporting
facts was due to his incarceration. He wrote, “Petitioner could not secure any evidence while
incarcerated, which was why, he requested counsel.” (R., p.58.) Similarly, he stated, “Petitioner
is incarcerated and has no means of securing any medical records . . . ,” and “Petitioner needs
counsel to secure medical experts to testify to the medical state that the Petitioner was in at the
time of the breath test based on the evaluation given by law enforcement.” (R., pp.63-64.)
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Finally, the State argues that, even if the district court applied the wrong standard, this
Court should affirm because Mr. Fernandez failed to allege facts showing the possibility of a
valid claim.

(Respondent’s Brief, p.8.)

However, this is not supported by the record.

Mr. Fernandez alleged that his trial counsel was ineffective because she failed to present
evidence that Mr. Fernandez was in a state of ketoacidosis when he was breath-tested. (R., p.17.)
He also asserted that his trial counsel failed to question her defense experts thoroughly and thus
determine that she needed additional experts to lay foundation—regarding ketoacidosis, the
breath-testing machinery, GERD, diabetes, and his medical history—for the testimony of the
expert who was ultimately excluded when the district court granted the State’s motion in limine.
(R., pp.18, 20-21.) Therefore, much like the situation in Swader, Mr. Fernandez alleged facts
showing the possibility of a valid claim, and a reasonable person in his position would certainly
be willing to retain counsel to investigate further and locate the appropriate medical records to
support those allegations.
The district court recognized that Mr. Fernandez had not provided the necessary facts to
support a valid claim. (R., p.30.) But it did not recognize that Swader specifically addressed this
situation when discussing the appropriate standard for the appointment of counsel. The Swader
Court stated, “Swader may have failed to allege facts supporting a valid claim because they do
not exist, or because she was unable to conduct an adequate investigation while incarcerated.”
143 Idaho at 654-55. In this case, Mr. Fernandez’s memorandum in support of his objection to
the district court’s notice of intent to dismiss makes it clear that he was unable to investigate and
collect records because he was incarcerated.
The district court applied an incorrect legal standard when it denied Mr. Fernandez’s
motion for the appointment of counsel because it did not recognize that I.C. § 19-852 no longer
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applies in post-conviction cases, and it denied his motion without considering whether
Mr. Fernandez’s circumstances prevented him from conducting an adequate investigation into
the facts. At the least, the district court, after reviewing Mr. Fernandez’s objection to its notice
of intent to dismiss, should have entered an order granting the appointment of counsel because
his objection made it clear that he could not provide the necessary facts while he was
incarcerated. The district court’s failure to do so was an abuse of discretion because it was not
consistent with the legal standards applicable to its specific choices. The State has failed to
prove otherwise.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Fernandez respectfully requests that his case be remanded, and he be permitted to
proceed with his petition for post-conviction relief with court-appointed counsel.
DATED this 18th day of April, 2018.

_________/s/________________
REED P. ANDERSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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